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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 15/07/2011

Accident number: 762

Accident time: Not recorded

Accident Date: 05/05/2007

Where it occurred: CBU 829, Area 2 Ayta
Ash Shaab town

Country: Lebanon

Primary cause: Inadequate survey (?)

Secondary cause: Other (?)

Class: Missed-mine accident
ID original source: BOI 005/07

Date of main report: 09/05/2007
Name of source: UN MACC SL

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: MZD-2 submunition

Ground condition: rocks/stones
Date last modified: 15/07/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 0

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: UTM 719524-664828

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
no independent investigation available (?)
inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate survey (?)
inadequate equipment (?)
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?)
non injurious accident (?)

Accident report
The report of this incident was made available by the UN MACC in 2008. Its conversion into a
DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is
editorial. The report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.
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File Reference: BOI 005/07
BAC INCIDENT REPORT 009/2007
INVESTIGATION REPORT ON A MZD 2 SUB-MUNITTION AT CBU 829, Area 2 Ayta Ash
Shaab on the 5th May 2007
The Incident occurred in Area 2 (CBU 829), UTM 719524-664828 on the 5th May 2007, on a
Completed Site where one MZD 2 Sub-Munition was located when an access road was being
constructed.
References:
•
•
•
•

Lebanon National Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs)
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)
[Demining group] Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)
[Demining group] Completion Report CBU 829

Introduction
1. In accordance with the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs), the MACC
SL Programme Manager, Mr. [Name removed] and Lt.Col [Name removed], NDO
Representative, issued a Verbal Convening Order on Friday the 7th May 2007, for an incident
investigation independent inquiry. The MACC SL board members are Capt [Name removed]
LAF Operations Officer Areas 1-5, MACC SL and [Name removed], Chief of QA MACC SL.
2. This is a comprehensive report by the investigation board into the BAC Incident that
occurred on the 5th May 2007 which is based on the MACC SL investigation, the [Demining
group] completion report:

Date: 5th May 2007. Time of Incident: not known.
Location: Ayta Ash Shaab, Area 2, Lebanon, Task: CBU-829
UTM of location of the munition: 719524-664828
Task Start / Finish Date: 8th November to 19th December 2006
Reported by: MACC, SL, CLO [Name removed].
Reported to: Operations Department, MACC SL
Time of Incident report to MACC QA: N/A
MA Organisation POC: [Name removed], PM [Demining group]
Investigation Date/Time: 7th May 2007 14000hrs
Investigation Location: Task Dossier 2-007, CBU - 829
Investigation Team: Capt [Name removed], LAF Operations Officer, Areas 1-5 and [Name
removed], MACC SL C of QA Officer.
Explosive Ordnance Type: MZD 2 Submunition

Background
4. CBU 829 forms a part of 3 CBUs in task Dossier 2-007 issued to [Demining group] for
clearance as part of the sub-munitions clearance programme in SL. CBU 829 was completed
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on the 13 April 2007, see annex A for the [Demining group] Completion Report for CBUs
829,830 and 604. According to the [Demining group] file for the task was a combination of
surface and sub-surface clearance in accordance the TSGs and the operational clearance
plan, with a position left uncleared due to the unusable nature of the land. This area is likely to
contain additional MZD 2s. A combined total of 81,300m2 was cleared, of which 39,500m2
was sub-surface cleared. A total of 181 MZD 2 were located and destroyed during clearance..
Events leading up to the Incident
6. The land owner, [Name removed], immediately contacted the CLO area 1-5 on the 5th
May 2007 to report the location and the events surrounding the incident. This site was visited
by MACC SL Operations, QA and the CLO to conduct an investigation of the event
surrounding the discovery of the sub-munitions.

The accident site
BOI Post Incident Activities and General Observations
7. On arrival at the incident site, it was ascertained that they could gain safe access up to the
incident site without additional clearance being conducted. During the visit on the 7th May 07
it was possible to clearly view the location of the MZD 2.
8. On the inspection of the incident site on the 7th May 2007 the following general
observations were established:
•
•

The land area in which the MZD 2 was located had been developed to allow the
construction of an access road.
A significant amount of earth and rocks had been relocated for other area to form the
road.

The MZ-2 submunition in-situ
Geography and Weather
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9. CBU 829 is located, with the nearest Town being Ayta Ash Shaab. The land is primarily is
used for agriculture, but some construction is being undertaken on the site.
Conclusions
10. Based on the investigation, the documentation and visit to the site, the investigation
concludes the following:
•

CBU 829 was previously surface cleared as part of a task dossier 2-007, and
included CBUs 830 and 604, issued by the MACC SL to [Demining group].
• The location of the submunitions was identified as in an area that clearance had
taken place.
• The MZD 2 was located at ground level, was in good condition, free of dirt and no
damage was seen (see attached photos).
• An un-cleared area remains which may have MZD 2 located inside.
• The land owner wished to have the un-cleared area searched.
• It is unlikely that the MZD 2 sub-munitions would have been positioned in the location
with little damage, free of spoil and completely above or on the surface given the
amount of earthworks that was undertaken in the immediate and exact location of the
MZD 2.
Recommendations
11. The following are recommendations based on the BOI conclusions:
•
•
•

CLOs to continue to warn local residence of areas have been cleared and the
remaining un-cleared areas present a continued danger.
Appropriate warning signs are erected in areas where a there are un-cleared areas.
Identify the un-cleared areas for future clearance priorities.

Signed: [Name removed], C/QA Officer, MACC SL, [Name removed], LAF Operations Officer,
Area 1-5, NDO/MACC SL
9th May 2007
Comments by the MACC SL Chief of QA
[None]
[Name removed], UN Chief QA, MACC SL

Comments by the MACC SL Chief of Operations
[None]
[Name removed], UN Chief of Operations, MACC SL
Seen/Agreed
[Name removed], UN Programme Manager, MACC SL
Seen/Agreed
[Name removed], NDO Representative, MACC SL

Analysis
The primary cause of this Missed mine/device incident is listed as Inadequate survey because
the area had been subjected to a surface search when it should have been sub-surface
searched. The decision to conduct superficial surface search in areas where agricultural and
construction activity would take place was the responsibility of the MACC SL, the same body
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that investigated the incident, so no independent investigation was made. The secondary
cause is listed as Other because it is possible that the submunition was placed later.
The visual search of an area where devices may be below the ground surface is not
“clearance” as defined in the IMAS and increases the risk of civilian injury because it
encourages them to think that the area is safe to use.
It is noteworthy that the MACC SL BOI team “ascertained that they could gain safe access to
the incident site without additional clearance being conducted”, then entered the area without
PPE (photographs show this) and without searching for submunitions that may have been
close enough to the surface to have been disturbed by footfalls. This might be considered
irresponsible and unprofessional.
The Inadequate investigation referenced under Notes is included because the investigator’s
conclusions are anything but conclusive. They imply that the device may have been placed
where it was found. They do not seem to consider that it may have been missed during a
visual search, or may have rolled into position during earth moving in the area.
The Inadequate equipment referenced under Notes refers to the lack of a means of searching
sub-surface (metal-detector). No criticism of the commercial demining group is implied – it
was apparently carrying out the task as directed by the UN supported MACC.
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